We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with N selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov processes, conditioned on their current actions. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. Since each player has a different information set, this forms a dynamic game with asymmetric information and there is no known methodology to find perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) for such games in general. In this paper, we provide a two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm to find a class of PBE using a belief state based on common information of the players. We refer to such equilibria as structured Bayesian perfect equilibria (SPBE). The backward recursive part of this algorithm defines an equilibrium generating function. Each period in the backward recursion involves solving a fixed point equation on the space of probability simplexes for every possible belief on types. Using this function, equilibrium strategies and beliefs are defined through a forward recursion. We provide a public goods example to demonstrate the methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many practical scenarios where strategic players with different sets of observations are involved in a timeevolving dynamical process such that their actions influence each others' payoffs. Such scenarios include repeated online advertisement auctions, wireless resource sharing, competing sellers and energy markets. For example, in the case of repeated online advertisement auctions, advertisers place bids for locations on a website to sell a product. These bids are based on the value of that product, which is privately observed by an advertiser and past actions of everybody else, which are observed publicly. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize her reward, which depends on the value of the products and on the actions taken by everybody else. Such dynamical systems with strategic players are modeled as dynamic games. In dynamic games with perfect and symmetric information, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is an appropriate equilibrium concept [1] , [2] , [3] and there is a backward recursive algorithm to find all subgame perfect equilibria of such games. Maskin and Tirole in [4] introduced the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for dynamic games with perfect and symmetric information where equilibrium strategies are dependent on some payoff relevant state of the system rather than on the entire history. However, for games with asymmetric information, since players have different information sets in each period, they need to form a belief on the information sets of other players, based upon which they predict their strategies. As a result, SPE or MPE are not appropriate equilibrium concepts for such setting. There are several notions of equilibrium for such games, such as perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium, trembling hand equilibrium [1] , [3] . Each of these notions of equilibrium consists of a strategy and a belief profile of all players. The equilibrium strategies are optimal given the beliefs and the beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategy profile and using Bayes' rule (whenever possible), with some equilibrium concepts requiring further refinements. Due to this circular argument of beliefs being consistent with strategies, which are in turn optimal given the beliefs, finding such equilibria is a difficult task. Moreover, strategies are function of histories, which belong to an everexpanding space, and thus the space of optimization also becomes computationally intractable. There is no known methodology to find such equilibria for general dynamic games with asymmetric information.
In this paper, we consider a model where players observe their types privately and publicly observe the actions taken by other players at the end of each period. Their instantaneous rewards depend on everyones' types and actions. We provide a two-step algorithm involving a backward recursion followed by a forward recursion to construct a class of PBE for the dynamic game in consideration, which we call structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (SPBE). In these equilibria, players' strategies are based on their type and a set of beliefs on each type which is common to all players and lie in a time-invariant space. These beliefs on players' types form independent controlled Markov processes that together summarize the common information history and are updated individually and sequentially, based on corresponding agents' actions and (partial) strategies. The algorithm works as follows. In a backward recursive way, for each stage, the algorithm finds an equilibrium strategy function for all possible beliefs on types of the players which involves solving a fixed point equation on the space of probability simplexes. Then, the equilibrium strategies and beliefs are obtained through forward recursion by operating on the function obtained in the backward step. The SBPEs that are developed in this paper are analogous to the MPEs for dynamic games with perfect information in the sense that players choose their actions based on beliefs that depend on common information and have Markovian dynamics, where actions of a players are now partial functions from their private information to their action sets.
Related literature on this topic include [5] , [6] and [7] . Nayyar et al. in [5] , [6] consider a model of dynamic games with asymmetric information. They show that, under certain assumptions, the considered game can be transformed to another game with symmetric information. Once this is established, a backward recursive algorithm is provided to find MPE of the transformed game, which are equivalently Nash equilibria of the transformed symmetric information game. For this equivalence to hold, authors in [5] , [6] make a critical assumption in their model: based on the common information, a player's posterior beliefs about the system state and about other players' information are independent of the strategies used by the players in the past. In our model, we assume that the underlying state of the system has independent components, each constituting the type of a player. However, the common information based belief state are allowed to depend on players' strategies.
Ouyang et al. in [7] consider a dynamic oligopoly game with N strategic sellers of different goods and M strategic buyers. Each seller privately observes the valuation of their good, which is assumed to have independent Markovian dynamics, thus resulting in a dynamic game of asymmetric information. Authors in [7] consider a policy-dependent common information based belief state based on which they define the concept of common information based equilibria. They show that for any given update function of this belief state, which is consistent with strategies of the players, if all other players play actions based on this common belief and their private information, then player i faces a Markov decision process (MDP) with respect to its action with state as common belief and its type. For every prior distribution, this defines a fixed point equation on belief update functions and strategies of all players. They provide necessary and sufficient conditions for common information based strategy profile and belief update functions to constitute PBE of the game; however they do no provide a systematic way to find such equilibria. In addition, because of the special structure of the reward function, the problem admits a degenerate solution where agents' strategies do not depend on their private information and therefore no signaling takes place. This allows existence of myopic, type-independent equilibrium policies (although other equilibria may also exist).
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present our model. In section III we present structural results that serve as motivation for SPBE. In section IV we present the main result. We provide an example in Section V. We conclude in section VI. The proofs of Section III are presented in [8] and the proofs in Section IV are presented in Appendices.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use notation −i to represent all players other than player i i.e. −i = {1, 2, . . . i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N }. We use notation A t:t to represent vector (A t , A t+1 , . . . A t ) when t ≥ t or an empty vector if t < t. We use A −i t to mean
We remove superscripts or subscripts to represent the whole vector, for example A t represents (A 1 t , . . . , A N t ). In a similar vein, for any collection of sets (X i ) i∈N , we denote × i∈N X i by X . We denote the indicator function of any set A by I A (·). For any finite set S, P(S) represents the space of probability measures on S and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by P g (or E g ) the probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile g. We denote the set of real numbers by R. For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (β i t ) i∈N where probability of action a i t conditioned on a 1:t−1 x i 1:t is given by β i t (a i t |a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ), we use the short hand notation
. All equalities and inequalities involving random variables are to be interpreted in the a.s. sense.
II. MODEL
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with N strategic players in the set N = {1, 2, . . . N }, over a time horizon T = {1, 2, . . . T } and with perfect recall. There is a dynamic state of the system
, where X i t ∈ X i is the type of player i at time t which is perfectly observed and is its private information. Types of the players evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes such that, for t ∈ T ,
where Q i t are known kernels. Player i at time t takes action a i t ∈ A i on observing a 1:t−1 , which is common information among players, and x i 1:t which it observes privately. The sets A i , X i are assumed to be finite. Let g i = (g i t ) t∈T be a probabilistic strategy of player i where g i t :
be a strategy profile of all players. At the end of interval t, player i receives an instantaneous reward R i (x t , a t ). The objective of player i is to maximize its total expected reward
With all players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic game D with imperfect and asymmetric information, and with simultaneous moves.
III. MOTIVATION FOR STRUCTURED EQUILIBRIA
In this section we present structural results for the considered dynamical process that serve as a motivation for finding SPBE of the underlying game D. Specifically, we define a belief state based on common information history and show that any reward profile that can be obtained through a general strategy profile can also be obtained through strategies that depend on this belief state and player's current type which is its private information. These structural results are inspired by the analysis of decentralized team problems, which serve as guiding principles to design our equilibrium strategies. While these structural results provide intuition and the required notation, they are not directly used in the proofs for finding SPBEs, later, in Section IV.
At any time t, player i has information (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ) where a 1:t−1 is the common information among players, and x i 1:t is the private information of player i. Since (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ) increases with time, any strategy of the form
becomes unwieldy. Thus it is desirable to have an information state in a time-invariant space that succinctly summarizes (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ) and that can be sequentially updated. We first show in Fact 1 that given common information a 1:t−1 and its current type x i t , player i can discard its type history x i 1:t−1 and play a strategy of the form s i t (a i t |a 1:t−1 , x i t ). Then in Fact 2, we show that a 1:t−1 can be summarized through a belief π t , defined as follows.
For player i, we use notation g, where g i t :
It should be noted that since π t is a function of random variables a 1:t−1 , m policy is a special type of s policy, which in turn, is a special type of g policy.
Using the agent-by-agent approach [9] , we show in Fact 1 that any expected reward profile of the players that can be achieved by any general strategy profile g can also be achieved by a strategy profile s.
Fact 1: Given a fixed strategy g −i of all players other than player i and for any strategy g i of player i, there exists a strategy s i of player i such that
Since any s i policy is also a g i type policy, the above fact can be iterated over all players which implies that for any g policy profile there exists an s policy profile that achieves the same reward profile i.e. (J i,s ) i∈N = (J i,g ) i∈N .
Policies of types s still have increasing domain due to increasing common information, a 1:t−1 . In order to summarize this information, we take an equivalent view of the system dynamics through a common agent, as taken by Nayyar et al. in [10] . The common agent approach is a general approach that has been used extensively for dynamic team problems [11] - [14] . Using this approach, the problem can be equivalently described as follows: player i at time t observes a 1:t−1 and takes action γ i t , where γ i t : X i → P(A i ) is a partial (stochastic) function from its private information x i t to a i t of the form γ i t (a i t |x i t ). These actions are generated through some policy ψ i = (ψ i t ) t∈T , ψ i t : A t−1 → X i → P(A i ) , that operates on the common information a 1:t−1 so that γ i t = ψ i t [a 1:t−1 ]. Then any policy of the form
. We call a player i's policy through common agent to be of type ψ i if its actions γ i t are taken as γ i t = ψ i t [a 1:t−1 ]. We call a player i's policy through common agent to be of type
. A policy of type θ i is also a policy of type ψ i . There is a one-to-one correspondence between policies of type g i and of type ψ i and between policies of type m i and of type θ i . In the following fact, we show that the space of profiles of type s is outcome-equivalent to the space of profiles of type m.
Fact 2: For any given strategy profile s of all players, there exists a strategy profile m such that
where each π i t can be updated through an update function π i t+1 =F (π i t , γ i t , a t ) and F is independent of s. Thus there exists an update function F , independent of s, such that π t can be updated in the following way
Proof: The proof is presented as proof of Fact 2 in [8] . Since the update of π t is used in the proofs of results in Section IV, its proof is reproduced in Appendix I.
The above two facts show that any reward profile that can be generated through policy profile of type g can also be generated through policy profile of type m. It should be noted that the construction of s i depends only on g i , while the construction of m i depends on the whole policy profile g and not just on g i . Thus any unilateral deviation of player i in g policy profile does not necessarily translate to unilateral deviation of player i in the corresponding m policy profile. Therefore g being an equilibrium of the game (in some appropriate notion) does not necessitate the corresponding m also being an equilibrium.
As shown in the previous facts, due to the independence of types and their evolution as independent controlled Markov processes, for any strategy of the players, joint beliefs on types can be factorized as product of their marginals i.e. π t (x) = N i=1 π i t (x i t ). Since in this paper, we only deal with such joint beliefs, to accentuate this independence structure, we define π t ∈ × i∈N P(X i ) as vector of marginal beliefs where π t := (π i t ) i∈N . In the rest of the paper, we will use π t instead of π t whenever appropriate, where of course π t can be constructed from π t . Similarly, we define vector of belief updates as F (π, γ, a) := (F (π i , γ i , a)) i∈N . We also change the notation of policies of type m as m i t : × i∈N P(X i ) × X i → P(A i ) and common agent's policies of type θ as θ i t : × i∈N P(X i ) → X i → P(A i ) . In this paper our goal is to devise an algorithm to find structured equilibria of type m of the dynamic game D.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR SPBE COMPUTATION A. Preliminaries
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form h t = (a 1:t−1 , x 1:t ). Let H t be the set of such histories of the game at time t when players take action, H = ∪ T t=0 H t be the set of all possible such histories. At any time t player i observes h i t = (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ) and all players together have h c t = a 1:t−1 as common history. Let H i t be the set of observed histories of player i at time t and H c t be the set of common histories at time t. An appropriate concept of equilibrium for such games is PBE [3] , which consists of a pair (β * , µ * ) of strategy profile β * = (β * ,i t ) t∈T ,i∈N where β * ,i t :
and the beliefs satisfy some consistency conditions as described in [3, p. 331] . In general, a belief for player i at time t, i µ * t is defined on history h t = (a 1:t−1 , x 1:t ) given its private history h i t = (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ). Here player i's private history h i t = (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ) consists of a public part h c t = a 1:t−1 and a private part x i 1:t . At any time t, the relevant uncertainty player i has is about other players' type x −i t . In our setting, due to independence of types, player i's current type x i t does not provide any information about x −i t as will be shown later. For this reason we consider beliefs that are functions of each agent's history h i t only through the common history h c t . Hence, for each agent i, its belief for each history h c t = a 1:t−1 is derived from a common belief µ * t [a 1:t−1 ] which itself factorizes into a product of marginals j∈N µ * ,j t [a 1:t−1 ], as will be shown later. Thus we can sufficiently use the system of beliefs, µ * = (µ * t ) t∈T with µ * t : H c t → P(X ), with the understanding that agent i's belief on
. Under the above structure, all consistency conditions that are required for PBEs [3, p. 331 ] are automatically satisfied.
Structural results from Section III provide us motivation to study equilibria of the form (m i t (a i t |π t , x i t )) i∈N , which are equivalent to policy profiles of the form (θ i t [π t ](a i t |x i t )) i∈N and have the advantage of being defined on a time-invariant space.
B. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θ i t ) i∈N ,t∈T , where θ i t : × i∈N P(X i ) → X i → P(A i ) and a sequence of functions (V i t ) i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T +1} , where V i t : × i∈N P(X i ) × X i → R, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀π t ∈ × i∈N P(X i ), π t = i∈N π i t , let θ t [π t ] be generated as follows. Setγ t = θ t [π t ], whereγ t is the solution, if it exists 1 , of the following equation, ∀i ∈ N , x i t ∈ X i ,
It should be noted that in (8) ,γ i t is not the outcome of the maximization operation as in a best response equation similar to that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Rather (8) has characteristics of a fixed point equation. This is because the maximizerγ i t appears in both, the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation. This distinct construction allows the maximization operation to be done with respect to the variable γ i t (·|x i t ) for every x i t separately as opposed to be done with respect to the whole function γ i t (·|·), and is pivotal in the construction.
C. Forward Recursion
As discussed above, a pair of strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ) is a PBE if it satisfies (6) . Based on θ defined above in (7)-(9), we now construct a set of strategies β * and beliefs µ * for the game D in a forward recursive way, as follows 2 . As before, we will use the notation µ * t [a 1:t−1 ] := (µ * ,i t [a 1:
Theorem 1: A strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ), constructed through backward/forward recursion algorithm described in section IV (whenever it exists), is a PBE of the game, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a 1:t−1 , x i
(13) Proof: See Appendix II Independence of types is a crucial assumption in proving the above result, which manifests itself in Lemma 2 in Appendix III, used in the proof of Theorem 1. This is because, at equilibrium, player i's reward-to-go at time t, conditioned on its type x i t , depends on its strategy at time t, β i t , only through its action a i t and is independent of the corresponding partial function β i t (·|a 1:t−1 , ·). In other words, given x i t and a i t , player i's reward-to-go is independent of β i t .
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: A TWO STAGE PUBLIC

GOODS GAME
We consider a discrete version of Example 8.3 from [3, ch.8], which is an instance of a repeated public good game. There are two players who play a two period game. In each period t, they simultaneously decide whether to contribute to the period t public good, which is a binary decision a i t ∈ {0, 1} for player i = 1, 2. Before the start of period 2, both players know the actions taken by them in period 1. For both periods, each player gets reward 1 if at least one of them contributed and 0 if none does. Player i's cost of contributing is x i which is its private information. Both players believe that x i s are drawn independently and identically with probability distribution Q with support {x L , x H }; 0 < x L < 1 < x H , such that P Q (X i = x H ) = q where 0 < q < 1. This example is similar to our model where N = 2, T = 2 and reward for player i in period t is
We will use the backward recursive algorithm, defined in Section IV, to find an SPBE of this game. For period t = 1, 2 and for i = 1, 2, the partial functions γ i t can equivalently be defined through scalars p iL t and p iH ∈ [0, 1]. Henceforth, we will use p iL t and p iH t interchangeably with the corresponding γ i t . For t = 2 and for any fixed π 2 = (π 1 2 , π 2 2 ), where π i 2 = π i 2 (x H ) ∈ [0, 1] represents a probability measure on the event
Letγ 2 = θ 2 [π 2 ] and equivalently (p 1L 2 ,p 2L 2 ,p 1H 2 ,p 2H 2 ) = θ 2 [π 2 ] be defined through the following fixed point equation, which is equivalent to (8) . For i = 1, 2
Since 1 − x H < 0,p iH 2 = 0 achieves the maximum in (16b). Thus (16a)-(16b) can be reduced to, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
This implies,
(18) Figure 1 shows the solutions in the space of (π 1 2 , π 2 2 ). Thus for any π 2 , there can exist multiple equilibria and correspondingly multiple θ 2 [π 2 ] can be defined. For any particular θ 2 , at t = 1, the fixed point equation that needs to be solved is of the form, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
where F (Q 2 ,γ, (A 1 , A 2 )) =F (Q,γ 1 , A 1 )F (Q,γ 2 , A 2 ) and Using one such θ defined as follows, we find an SPBE of the game for q = 0.1, x L = 0.2, x H = 1.2. We use θ 2 [π 2 ] as one possible set of solutions of (18), described below,
Then, through iteration on the fixed point equation (19a)-(19b) and using the aforementioned θ 2 [π 2 ], we numerically find (and analytically verify) that
] is an SPBE of the game. Since θ 2 is symmetric, there also exists an (antisymmetric) equilibrium where θ 1 [Q 2 ] = (1, 0, 0, 0). We also obtain a symmetric equilibrium where θ 1 [ VI. CONCLUSION In this paper, we study a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where players private types evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes, conditioned on players current actions which are publicly observed. We present a two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm to find SPBE of this game, where equilibrium strategies are function of a Markov belief state π t , which depends on the common information, and current private types of the players. The backward recursive part of this algorithm defines an equilibrium generating function. Each period in backward recursion involves solving a fixed point equation on the space of probability simplexes for every possible belief on types. Then using this function, equilibrium strategies and beliefs are defined through a forward recursion. Future work includes considering types of players where players do not perfectly observe their types, rather they make noisy observations. In general, this methodology opens the door for finding PBEs for many applications, analytically or numerically, which was not feasible before. One such case would be dynamic LQG games where types evolve linearly with Gaussian noise and players incur quadratic cost.
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The authors wish to acknowledge Vijay Subramanian for his valuable contribution to the paper. Achilleas Anastasopoulos wishes to acknowledge Ashutosh Nayyar for the fruitful discussion and criticism of an early draft of this work presented during the ITA 2012 conference. APPENDIX I Claim 1: π t can be factorized as π t (x t ) = N i=1 π i t (x i t ) where each π i t can be updated through an update function π i t+1 =F (π i t , γ i t , a t ) andF is independent of common agent's policy ψ. Collecting all the marginals into the vector π t , we can write π t+1 = F (π t , γ t , a t ).
Proof: We prove this by induction. Since π 1 (x 1 ) = N i=1 Q i t (x i 1 ), the base case is verified. Now suppose π t = N i=1 π i t . Then, π t+1 (x t+1 ) = P ψ (x t+1 |a 1:t , γ 1:t ) (23a) = xt P ψ (x t , a t , x t+1 |a 1:t−1 , γ 1:t ) xt+1xt P ψ (x t ,x t+1 , a t |a 1:t−1 , γ 1:t )
where (23d) follows from induction hypothesis. It is assumed in (23b)-(23d) that the denominator is not 0. If the denominator corresponding to any γ i t in (23d) is zero, we define π i t+1 (x i t+1 ) = x i where (31d) follows from the conditional indepen-
